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 1 
Foreword 
 
The current conflict between Arabs and Jews in Israel/Palestine has ruptured 
relations between the two peoples, and essentially divided them along geographic, 
economic, cultural, political, and sociological lines.  Yet up until about a hundred years 
ago, these two peoples enjoyed a rich and deep shared history of coexistence, and lived 
together as neighbours in relative peace for centuries.   
This thesis is an attempt to uncover those memories, and use them to rekindle the 
tradition of cooperative coexistence between Jews and Arabs in that region.  It comes 
from listening to the stories of my mother’s parents, both born in British Mandate 
Palestine, and from my own unique identity as a Canadian-Israeli-Palestinian-Algerian-
Hungarian-Polish Jew and pagan.  It comes from my own conflict of understanding the 
creation of the State of Israel as a rescue spot for Holocaust survivors like my father’s 
mother, and my discontent with religious nationalism and its racist dimensions.  It is 
above all an affirmation that peace is an ongoing relational process worth cultivating, and 
will never be achieved so long as Jews and Arabs stay separate, segregated, and 
ghettoized within their respective communities.   
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Chapter One 
Personal Reflection & The Politics of Memory 
 
 Resting in the shade of an olive tree, I smile as we enjoy an afternoon meal of pita 
bread, zatar (spice mixture), and lebane (yogurt cheese).  We talk for hours about our 
people, our histories, and ourselves.  We cook together, clean together, and plan our days 
together.  Here we are, a group of Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs, in the middle of 
a war zone, living together around the clock in the West Bank village of Mas’ha.  What 
brings us together is a vision for peace, justice, and coexistence, and we manage to create 
a microcosm of those very things in a makeshift “peace camp” organized by the villagers.  
We are visited by an influx of well-wishers and supporters, bringing us supplies and 
encouragement.  The Israeli army also pays an occasional visit, perplexed by our 
symbolic presence, and the reality of Jewish Israelis feeling at home in an Arab village. 
 In those dry summer days, I had come to taste cooperative coexistence and 
experience the joy of breaking down walls of separation through seeing the ‘other’.  
Several years later, Mas’ha still holds a special place in my heart.  Keeping in touch with 
my friends there has been challenging, yet the occasional phone call or e-mail is most 
celebrated.  Knowing that I have lived Arab-Jewish cooperative coexistence gives me 
fuel to continue the slow and sometimes daunting work of peace building. 
 Using the rich, shared history between Arabs and Jews in historical Palestine, 
coupled with critical thinking and analysis, this thesis attempts to answer the question,  
“How do we renew the tradition of Arab-Jewish cooperative coexistence in 
Israel/Palestine today?”  Memory becomes our first guidepost.     
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Memory 
 
Memory is mythology.  What we call memories are current interpretations of 
remembered past experiences.  Whether it is a memory of the last few minutes, or of an 
event twenty years ago, our current mindset filters that image and presents it to us as 
history.  So what is history?  The story we want to tell ourselves based on our current 
beliefs.  Yet orthodox society insists that memory is an “objective” process of recalling 
information from the storehouse of the mind, like a big computer database that we simply 
go into to get “the facts.”  This would be true if our minds functioned like an endless tape 
recorder, storing every last detail and bit of experience that comes our way, unfiltered.  
Surely this is equated with madness in today’s world.  What we call memory is carefully 
selected information that fits with our preconceived ideas about who we are, what this 
world is, and how we go about living our lives.  So the myths we tell ourselves about life 
predetermines what our memories will be.  And as our myths and worldviews change, our 
memories change too. 
This is both good and bad news.  The good news is that we are creatures capable 
of continuously changing our realities.  The bad news is that we often refuse to open our 
minds to new ways of perception.  Our identities become threatened as soon as a new 
narrative is introduced.  Philosophers, historians and even poets often forget that when 
speaking of human conflict, we are actually speaking of a clash of memories.  For often 
the ‘enemy’ or the ‘other’ does nothing more than challenge the way that we think about 
our collective and individual history.  The intense intimacy between identity and 
memory, therefore, is the forerunner in determining whom we befriend, and whom we 
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deplore.  Memory researchers Paul Antze and Michael Lambek write, “Memories do not 
merely describe the speaker’s relation to the past but place her quite specifically in 
reference to it.”1  Freud agreed, “It’s how you remember, not actually what happened.”2  
So in exploring memory, metaphor and myth become essential guideposts.  In this sense, 
the analogy of a landscape, castle, or city fits better than that of a computer database.  
Even mainstream psychology understands that memory recall is not a simple matter of 
linear retrieval.  In the area of ‘Eyewitness Testimony’, approximately half of all 
wrongful convictions are due to misidentification.3  In many cases, witnesses standing 
next to the perpetrator(s) for a substantial period of time still had a hard time identifying 
the suspect(s) to police.  Memory researcher Elizabeth Loftus has determined that one 
major factor in this phenomena is violence.  People tend to focus on the weapons used, 
and not so much on the individuals.  Loftus and Burns have shown that when it comes to 
violence towards a child, many witnesses could not remember anything (events, 
environment) before the child was shot, even when shown an elaborate video.  The 
fixation on the weapon and/or violence committed froze these people’s imaginations to a 
degree where not much else could be recalled.4  
Memory is no laughing matter in Israel and Palestine.  Cruise around a café in Tel 
Aviv, Jerusalem, or Ramallah, and you will find people debating history quite 
passionately, rummaging over not just the last 50 years, but 5,000 years.  This ritual, this 
intense hashing out, is a fundamental part of keeping the culture attuned to its own 
narrative, and relishing a strong sense of collective identity.  No doubt many observers 
                                                 
1
 Antze and Lambek (1996), p xxv 
2
 Hillman and Ventura (1992), p 27 
3Wall (2004), PSY100Y1Y Lecture 11  
4
 ibid 
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find this ritual strange, if not pointless.  Yet memory and identity run deep in this part of 
the world, and even semantics are often held in high regard. 
In considering political solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the dilemma of 
convincing people that peace is possible remains.  While most Palestinians and Israelis 
today are determined to find a negotiated settlement to their difficulties, many are still 
envisioning neutrality at best.  Perhaps this is wise in the short-term, but if the goal is 
relatedness and coexistence, memory could be a powerful tool in bringing these two 
peoples closer.  For Arabs and Jews share a rich and powerful history together as 
neighbours, friends, lovers, business partners, and family.  We must resuscitate these 
memories not in order to relive them, but to re-imagine them.   
 
Childhood 
 
My earliest childhood memories, as I imagine them today, are the sights, smells, 
sounds, and feels of Israel from the late seventies to the early eighties.  I was the firstborn 
child of Meira and Shimon Zer-Aviv, a young couple in their early twenties struggling 
with the duties and pressures of being newlyweds and making a life for themselves.  We 
lived on the outskirts of Tel Aviv, in a low-rise apartment building with a community 
feel.  I remember the kids in that apartment building running wild, always finding another 
game or adventure to play.  
My most vivid memories, though, are not of my parents or that building, but of 
my grandparents and their house in Givathaim, another suburb of Tel Aviv.  Margalete 
and Zvi Puni were both born in British Mandate Palestine, and became members of the 
militant Irgun underground resistance movement in their teens, where they met.  They 
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went on to marry, and raise a family in the newly formed Jewish state.  While eventually 
breaking ties with political groups and movements in their adult life, they still lived 
largely in the stories and memories of the Irgun, or ETZEL, as they knew it.  One of the 
biggest childhood treats for me was crawling into bed with Safta and Saba (Hebrew for 
‘grandmother’ and ‘grandfather’, respectively) and having them tell me the stories of 
their childhoods in Palestine, of their struggles, and of their experiences in the wars.  I 
would listen intently, and visualize the images coming through their words.  I felt a 
kindred connection not only with these stories, but also with my grandparents in general. 
My earliest impressions of “the Arabs” were not unlike those of many Israelis.  
My grandparents recited story after story depicting Arabs as violent, murderous, 
dangerous and ‘other’.  Even when I got to the age where I could begin to understand the 
situation a little better, any mention of compromise with “the Arabs” was met with bitter 
cynicism and sharp counter-argument.   
My parents left Israel in 1981, when I was four years old, to try their luck in 
Canada.  Israel was in economic recession, and my parents were tired of intense personal 
and collective pressures imposed on them.  My mother in particular did not want to see 
her kids become soldiers in their youth.  Continuing in the family work tradition, my 
parents, grandparents (who also came to live in Canada), and aunt soon opened a bakery 
in the heart of Toronto’s Chinatown, where we all lived.   
One of my greatest initiations came to me with the help of Jesus.  I was playing 
one of Jesus’ Wise Men in the elementary school play, and my mother nearly had a heart 
attack when she stood there watching me deliver the frankincense and myrrh to the baby 
Jesus.  Aside from possibly being the only Jews in our downtown Toronto elementary 
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school, my sister and I were among the few non-Chinese students as well.  My parents 
decided they wanted their kids to get a Jewish education, and while falling short of 
putting us in private Jewish day school, we did pack up and move to the highly Jewish 
suburb of Thornhill.   
I never felt particularly attached to being a practicing Jew, as I was raised to be 
much more of a Zionist.  My father, an aspiring journalist, was very involved with the 
Israeli community in Toronto, hosting an Israeli radio show every week and bringing 
performers from Israel to Toronto on a regular basis.  I grew up with some of the most 
famous Israeli musical stars in my living room, not really taking notice of them at all.  
Judaism was always secondary to Zionism in our household, which is very reflective of 
Israeli society on the whole.  While my parents were never ultra-nationalists, and would 
probably be described best as ‘right-of-centre’ politically, Israeli flags would decorate 
many parts of our house, and my dad would even hook up radio antennas to the backyard 
fence to pick up Israeli broadcasts half the world away.  My parents were proud of their 
country and identity, and always spoke Hebrew to us.   
During my first few years of university, I began to read deeper accounts of Jewish 
history, and of my Israeli-Palestinian-Algerian-Hungarian-Polish ancestry.  I sat with 
different relatives and dug up our family tree, and tried to get an intimate portrait of my 
ancestors.  Who were they?  What did they do?  What interesting stories lay beneath the 
surface?  What emerged was a set of unique narratives that resonated deeply with me.  
And I was determined to dig even more. 
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Arabs & Jews 
 
Through my excavations, I became really aware of the intimate history that Jews 
and Arabs shared throughout the years, and how my homeland, Israel, was also Palestine 
to many Arabs.  I began to read history from a Palestinian perspective, as my knowledge 
had largely been filtered through Israeli eyes until then.  I was taken by how in the course 
of establishing Israel as a rescue spot for Jewish refugees and Jewish self-determination, 
Palestinians and other Arabs had been uprooted, displaced, and made refugees.  I was 
strongly affected by the plight of the Palestinian people, and while always supporting 
peace for Israel/Palestine, I had known little of the past and current realities in-depth. 
Around the same time, the political situation in Israel/Palestine was heating up 
tremendously.  The Oslo peace process was crumbling, and extremism on both sides was 
rising exponentially.  I had been a strong supporter of the Oslo process, and really 
believed this would bring resolution to the conflict.  When final status negotiations 
crumbled in 2000, the situation really began to take a turn for the worse.  I watched from 
afar, mourning the apparent descent of the peace process, but never thought to involve 
myself as more than a spectator and dinner-table activist.  All that changed with the 
election of Ariel Sharon in 2001.  It was like a bad dinner guest becoming master of the 
house overnight.  I could not believe such a militant, fanatical, far-right figure would ever 
rise to power in Israel.   
With Sharon’s election victory, and the world blaming Yasser Arafat and the 
Palestinian leadership for the collapse of Oslo, I knew that something more complex must 
be going on beneath the surface.  I began to unplug from mainstream media, which told a 
simple story of Arafat rejecting “the most generous offer” ever put on the table by Israel, 
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painting him as a terrorist and instigator of the second major Palestinian uprising in 2001.  
I went directly to the source, examining the documents and details of the negotiations, 
and read both side’s accounts of what went wrong.  It became so plainly obvious, so 
blaringly clear, that Israel and the United States had rushed the process and pushed Arafat 
into a corner for their own political gain.  When Arafat rejected “the most generous 
offer”, which was a plan to reduce the new Palestinian state to a series of Bantustans 
(isolated enclaves), and keep the Israeli army in the Occupied Territories, he was cut-off 
from the process and branded demonic.  Arafat, for his part, did not come up with a 
counterproposal that would clearly define the borders and status of the new Palestinian 
state.  The Palestinian uprising that followed came from the streets and refugee camps in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where ordinary people had seen their lives get 
progressively worse under Israeli military occupation during the Oslo years.  Rage that 
had been building for years came to a head with the final collapse of the process. 
When I began to share this information with people, especially my fellow Israelis, 
I was frowned upon and told that I don’t have my facts straight.  A new consensus was 
emerging in Israeli society that “there is no partner for peace” and that the Arabs had 
once again rejected Israel’s attempts at making peace.  This was cemented by the fresh 
eruption of suicide bombings that targeted innocent Israeli civilians on buses and other 
public places.  In a matter of months, Israel was being hit by the strongest wave of 
Palestinian terror attacks it had ever experienced.  Ariel Sharon reoccupied all of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip within his first year of office, and unleashed a fury of brutality 
and devastation through military force.  Palestinian life continued to deteriorate, and the 
Palestinian people as a whole were being punished for the acts of the suicide bombers. 
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It was painful to see images of Palestinians under collective curfew, being 
randomly detained, humiliated, and under siege by an invading army.  It was just as 
painful to watch innocent Israeli civilians being blown up on buses and streets.  I knew I 
had to take a stand, as the current status quo was not only unacceptable, but also 
poisonous.  I put my foot down at Passover dinner 2001, reading a speech affirming both 
Palestinian and Israeli human life, and denouncing the acts of Ariel Sharon and the 
suicide bombers.  I took a clear stand against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, and presented some of the atrocities being committed in our name as Israelis 
and Jews.  My family was not pleased, and I was called naïve (which became the least of 
what I would be called in the years following). 
As I “came out” with my viewpoints, it was clear that the situation was polarizing 
rapidly, and that I would be assigned to the “far left” of the political spectrum.  The 
“mushy middle” seemed to be all but gone, and even some mainstream Israeli dovish 
circles were calling for force and attack.  I knew the dangers of polarization, and my 
susceptibility to getting “locked in.”  Only a few years earlier I had studied polarity 
therapy, a holistic modality focusing on creating balance through understanding the 
interconnection of opposites in the body/mind.  Healing needed integration of polarities, 
or opposites, and problems in one part of the system often responded positively to work 
on another part of the system. 
What I found in many radical leftist circles was a voice for my message, but also 
a lot of rigidity.  Israel was often demonized as a colonialist extension of the United 
States, and many nuances and complexities were conveniently overlooked or ignored.  
Sadly, I also witnessed a significant amount of militancy in the radical left.  I was often 
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criticized for my pacifist perspective, and found some of my comrades advocating violent 
resistance, and disregarding human life as sacred.  The one group I did hold in great 
esteem was The Tikkun Community of Toronto, a small group of diverse activists calling 
for an end to all violence, and approaching the situation from a place of compassionate 
listening and justice for both Palestinians and Israelis.  They were often criticized from 
both the left and right, which I viewed as healthy in such a polarized time. 
I spent the summer of 2002 in Israel and the West Bank, working with The Israeli 
Committee Against House Demolitions in Jerusalem and the International Solidarity 
Movement (ISM) in the West Bank.  I was deeply influenced by what I saw happening in 
the region, and disgusted by the abuses I witnessed the Israeli army carrying out.  After 
spending a week in Balata Refugee Camp near Nablus, I began to understand how these 
refugee camps contribute to the breeding of terrorism.  I had intimate conversations with 
some of the youth of Balata, who told me flat out that as their reasons for living 
deteriorated, they would rather die doing something, anything, than be victimized by the 
Israeli army.  I found this very hard to digest, and did not want to accept this logic at first.  
Then I saw what life in Balata was really like.  Israeli army flares lit up the night sky, 
with incursions into the camp regularly.  Army barricades and roadblocks were 
everywhere.  Basic essential services were missing or severely lacking.  The United 
Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) was barely keeping up with the needs of the 
refugees.  It became obvious that so long as people lived like this, in extremism, these 
camps would continue to breed extremists.  While certainly not justifying terrorism or 
suicide bombings, I began to see some of their deeper causes. 
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I find myself in Israel again marking the 2005 calendar year, attempting to renew 
my connection to the peoples and cultures of this region.  I am searching for the stories 
that lie here overlooked, which speak of goodwill and reconciliation between Jews and 
Arabs.  At the same time, I am also looking for the stories that speak of the hardships and 
down side of relations through time, to remind us what we are working with, and help us 
understand the fears and traumas that have soaked the land here.  My argument that 
genuine, lasting peace in Israel/Palestine can only be accomplished by bringing together 
Arabs and Jews for cooperative ventures, free of nationalistic goals, should not be 
confused with the ‘melting pot’ idea, where everybody is encouraged to give up part of 
their identity to form a homogenous monoculture.  The emphasis is on multiculturalism, 
not assimilation.  The emphasis is on diversity, not uniformity.  My vision is to see Arabs 
and Jews living once again as neighbours and friends, with each group feeling safe and 
secure in an environment rooted in full equality and respect.  I see the fabric of this new 
society resting on cooperative structures that promote partnership, community, 
environmental sanity, human rights, and personal boundaries, while moving beyond 
hierarchal, centralized structures.  It is my belief that such a revolution will happen at the 
grassroots level, and stay there to promote a diverse range of networks and microcosms.   
 I share my story to initiate and invoke memory as healer, bridge builder, and wise 
counsel.  What is desperately needed right now in Israel/Palestine is a new way of 
memory making.  The last 100 years have drastically changed Jews and Arabs 
perceptions of one another, and what many remember now centers on a legacy of war, 
occupation, displacement, and bloodshed.  This is perhaps the worst form of cultural 
erosion.  Like the earlier example of eyewitnesses only being able to recall the violence 
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and weapons at the scene, many Israeli and Palestinian imaginations have become frozen, 
forgetting each other’s faces and stories.  My basic premise in this thesis reflects that of 
memory researchers Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, who state “…that memories are 
never simply records of the past, but are interpretative reconstructions that bear the 
imprint of local narrative conventions, cultural assumptions, discursive formations and 
practices, and social contexts of recall and commemoration.”5  More simply put, what we 
remember is determined by what we have become accustomed to believe and think. 
 
Terminology 
 
In moving forward on this journey, it is important to be aware that there is no 
such thing as a ‘value-neutral’ term.  Definitions and terminologies are all rooted in a 
particular perspective and source.  They are littered with assumptions and biases, and 
even commonly used terms can be very widely contested.  In attempting to put together a 
work on ‘Arab-Jewish Cooperative Coexistence in Israel/Palestine’, I am very invested in 
using terms and definitions that transcend segregation, and highlight equity and diversity.  
In making my argument, I have chosen to omit several common terms I feel are 
problematic, the first of which is the term ‘Middle East’.  It is Euro-centric in origin 
because it defines the regions of the world in relation to Europe as the center.  Obviously 
it is a colonialist remnant still popularly used today.  In speaking of the Eastern 
Mediterranean Coast region, which includes Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, 
Syria, and Turkey, the term ‘West Asia’ is used throughout this work.  West Asia also 
                                                 
5
 Antze and Lambek (1996), p vii 
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encompasses the Arabian Peninsula, which includes Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  ‘West Asians’ are referred to as the collective people 
of the region.  In referring to European influence in the world, the term ‘Occidental’ or 
‘Occidentalism’ is used instead of ‘Western’.  Likewise, in describing Asian influence, 
‘Oriental’ or ‘Orientalism’ is used instead of ‘Eastern’. 
Some other popular terms omitted here are ‘Israeli Arab’ and ‘Arab Israeli’.  The 
majority of Arabs and Palestinians living within Israel proper today define themselves as 
such, without considering themselves ‘Israelis’.6  In more accurately reflecting these 
people’s chosen identities, the term ‘Arab citizen of Israel’ and ‘Palestinian citizen of 
Israel’ will be used here.  In transcending nationalism, the term ‘Israel/Palestine’ is used 
most often to describe the entire region of modern-day Israel, the West Bank, and the 
Gaza Strip.  The term ‘Israel’ is used when describing modern-day Israel, minus the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The term ‘Palestine’ is used to describe the territories of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.  Lastly, the term ‘Historical Palestine’ is also used to describe the 
area of Israel/Palestine, keeping in mind that Palestinian national identity is only a recent 
development.  
Some common misconceptions need to be cleared up as well.  The term ‘Semitic’ 
refers to that of the Afro-Asiatic language family that includes Hebrew, Aramaic, Arabic, 
and Ethiopic.7  Thus all peoples who identify with those languages can be considered 
‘Semites’, including Arabs, Jews, Ethiopians, and Armenians.  There is a common 
misconception that only Jews are Semitic peoples.  The term ‘Arab’ refers to a member 
of a Semitic people originating in the central and northern Arabian Peninsula, now 
                                                 
6
 Abu-Nimer (1999), p32 
7
 Penguin English Dictionary (1992), p 844 
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widespread throughout West Asia and North Africa, with Arabic as their common 
language.  Arabs trace their lineage to Abraham through his son Ishmael.  Not all Arabs 
are Muslims, and only 1/5th of the world’s Muslims are Arabs.  Arabs do not consider 
themselves a nation-state, but rather a people.8  The term ‘Jew’ refers to a member of a 
Semitic people tracing their lineage to Abraham through his son Isaac.  They are 
historically and biblically known as ‘Hebrews’ or ‘Israelites’.  Jews consider themselves 
a people, as well as a religious, ethnic, and cultural group.  The majority of Jews in the 
world today live in Israel and the United States, but can be found in many different 
countries around the world.9   
Lastly, this work is written with an inclusive and egalitarian perspective.  The 
terms ‘she’ and ‘he’ are used interchangeably when speaking in the third person.  The 
stories and narratives selected attempt to reflect a diversity of experiences, and consider 
people whose stories have been drowned out by dominant patriarchal culture.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Bickerton and Klausner (2002), pp 4-5 
9
 Bickerton and Klausner (2002), p 5 
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Chapter Two 
Awakening Memory: The Historical Seeds of Cooperative Coexistence 
 
 The first contact between Arabs and Jews can be traced to biblical times.  In the 
Old Testament, the term Arab was given to the nomadic people of the central and 
northern Arabian Peninsula.  Different tribal groups made up this collective, all sharing a 
desert lifestyle and an unwritten code of honor called muruwwa.10  Jews trace their own 
heritage to the Semitic tribe or group of peoples known as the Hebrews or Israelites.  
Since biblical records of contact, Arabs and Jews have been in close contact through the 
Hebrew, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine periods.  With the 
rise of Islam in the 7th and 8th centuries, Arabic became the main language in West Asia.  
Arabs and Jews coexisted continuously since the rise of Islam in a vast geographical area 
stretching from Morocco to the borders of China.  The Jews of the Islamic world made up 
about 90% of world Jewry until the 13th century.  Even by the 17th century, half of all 
world Jewry was found in Muslim lands.11 
  The period of Ottoman rule over historical Palestine stretched for over 400 years, 
from 1516 to 1918.  During these years, Palestine was divided into several districts, 
called sanjaks, which were parts of larger provinces or administrative units called 
vilayets.12  Under this system, Palestine never formed a political administrative unit of its 
own.  The Ottoman government in Constantinople paid little attention to the Palestine 
districts until the middle of the 19th century.  The area raised only minimal revenue, and 
had little military or strategic importance.  Only after a decade of Egyptian occupation in 
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 Bickerton & Klausner (2002), p 4 
11
 De Lange (1997), p 143 
12
 Bickerton & Klausner (2002), p 17 
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the mid 19th century, coupled with Anglo-French interest in the region, did the Ottomans 
take more notice of Palestine and assert their control.  This included increasing their 
military presence, encouraging modernization in communications, education, roads, and 
infrastructure, and allowing a European company to build a railroad between Jerusalem 
and Jaffa in 1892, and then between Haifa and Deraa (Transjordan) in 1905.13 
 Palestine has historically been diverse in terms of the urban-rural-nomadic divide.  
Its villages were small, isolated and poor.  The main source of income was from growing 
crops, and raising a few goats or sheep.14  These rural communities were organized into 
patrilineal clans called hamulas, which set out defined roles and responsibilities.  Hamula 
chiefs were called shayks, and they were responsible for collecting taxes for the Ottoman 
authorities.15  Sunni Muslims made-up the majority religious group in Palestine, with 
Christian, Jewish, Shiite, and Druze minorities.16   
 The Ottoman Empire provided a hospitable welcome for Jews fleeing Christian 
lands.   Most of the new settlers were Sephardim (of Spanish ancestry).  The center of the 
new community was not in Jerusalem though, but in the northern Galilee town of Safad.  
The turbulence of the times in Europe was marked by Jewish expulsion, the breakdown 
of religious unity, and the retreat of Christendom before the Turks.  All of this led many 
Jews to believe that the Messiah was arriving, and that they should take to studying 
scripture and mysticism.  Safad, aside from being an important commercial center, was a 
historic center of Jewish mysticism, commonly called Kabballah.  The 16th century Jews 
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 Bickerton & Klausner (2002), p 19 
14
 Bickerton & Klausner (2002), p 19 
15
 Farsoun & Zacharia (1997), pp 24-26  
16
 Bickerton & Klausner (2002), p 20 
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of Safad lived in a tight-knit community, separate from Arab neighbourhoods.17  
Kabballah study flourished during these years, and the community grew rapidly until 
regional instability, coupled with a strong earthquake in 1759, saw the end of Safad’s rise 
as the central Jewish center in Palestine.18   
    By the mid 17th century, there were some one million Jews worldwide, with 
about half living in Islamic countries.19  Under Muslim Ottoman rule, there was no single 
uniform policy towards the treatment of Jews and other non-Muslims.  Whatever policies 
existed were considered ad hoc and liberal, and largely depended on the ruling caliph.20  
Non-Muslims were considered dhimmis, historically translated to mean ‘people of a 
contract or covenant’, but implemented to mean ‘second-class citizens’.21  Dhimmis were 
subjected to a special poll tax called jizya, and restricted from much of societal life.  
Their testimony against Muslims was not accepted in courts of justice, and they were 
subject to forced relocation.  Jews in particular were required to wear a yellow turban, 
and wear a bell around their neck upon entering the bathhouse, announcing their arrival.22 
Muslims treated Jews better than Christians overall during Ottoman rule.  This may be 
due in large part to the fact that Christians were less subservient to their Muslim 
conquerors than were the Jews.  Historian Moshe Ma’oz comments, “Jews in Syria and 
Palestine usually endeavored to prove their loyalty to the Muslim Ottoman State, 
particularly when it was exposed to external danger, such as during the Crimean war.”23  
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 Jews could, however, practice their religion freely, and were given a considerable 
degree of autonomy within the Ottoman ‘millet system’.  This system guaranteed each 
individual non-Muslim religious community official State recognition, represented 
through a designated community leader.  This left non-Muslims with complete 
management of their own affairs in the areas of education, law courts, religious worship, 
and personal status.  The Turks also established a chief rabbi, the Haham Bashi, in 
Constantinople.  His role was to oversee Jewish affairs in the entire Empire.24  Religious 
pluralism and tolerance was present at all times, with a notable degree of joint religious 
feasts, shared places of pilgrimage, and mutual saint worship across Palestine.   One 
famous example is the holy spring near Akko, where Jews and Muslims would gather to 
pay worship and pilgrimage.  Biblical saints common to both religions were worshipped, 
including King David/The Prophet David, The Patriarch Abraham/Ibrahim, and his great-
grandsons.  Most unique, perhaps, was the practice of employing members of another 
religion to pray for you, which was done by Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Palestine.25   
 Common folk culture has long been shared between Arabs and Jews throughout 
West Asia and North Africa.  Many beliefs and practices around spirits, amulets, and 
protective devices were practiced across religions.  In my interviews with Jerusalemite 
elders, documented later in this chapter, I have heard more than once that “99% of people 
in Jerusalem died of the Evil Eye, and 1% from disease.”26  This expression reveals the 
belief in malefic spirits and curses common in both Arab and Jewish cultures.  Malefic 
spirits, called Jinn in Arabic, are warded off through protective measures.  The Evil Eye, 
common to Jewish culture, is another source of harm often counteracted by such things as 
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amulets, fire, and water.  A popular protective amulet in both Arab and Jewish traditions 
is the khamsa, meaning ‘five’ in Arabic, shaped like a human hand.  The Star of David is 
another protective charm for many West Asian and North African Jews and Arabs, 
especially in Morocco.  One traditionally popular folk practice used by both Arab and 
Jewish women was swallowing of the foreskin as a fertility charm.  Infertile women in 
Tripoli, Libya especially used this practice.27 
 There are numerous Ottoman records documenting joint Arab-Jewish cooperative 
projects and ventures in Palestine throughout the 16th century onwards.  In Jerusalem, for 
example, Jews and Arabs formed joint businesses, and relied on one another for specific 
goods and services.  Many Muslims purchased meat from Jewish butchers in the belief 
that it was more sanitary.  Meat slaughtered by Jews was often distributed through 
Muslim meat vendor’s shops in the market.  Among shoemakers, records reveal joint 
Arab-Jewish working environments, and interaction between Arabs and Jews in buying 
and selling from one another.28  The spice market in 16th century Jerusalem featured a 
mix of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish merchants, all doing business next to one another.29  
In 1537, two Jews and one Muslim were jointly operating a flourmill.30  Jewish bakeries 
rented their ovens to Muslims for baking, and many Jewish traders did business with 
Bedouins who frequented Jerusalem.31  Arab villages outside Jerusalem invited Jewish 
cheese makers to sell their products in their communities, and jewelers were known to 
transact across ethnic boundaries.32  Among the medical profession, Arab and Jewish 
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doctors were known to substitute for one another when one was away from the Jerusalem 
for short periods.  In 1547, the Muslim head doctor of Jerusalem appointed a Jew and 
Christian to replace him while on leave to Istanbul for a few months.  Similarly, a Jewish 
head doctor in Jerusalem appointed a Muslim to replace him while on a three-month trip 
to Cairo in 1571.33 
 
 My grandmother, Margalete Puni, remembers life in British Mandate Palestine 
where she was born.  Born 1930 in Jerusalem to Mazal and Yousef Baruchiel, Sephardic 
Jews with roots there, Margalete was raised in the newly formed city of Tel Aviv.  As a 
child, she would visit her relatives in Jerusalem.  Her aunt, Yochevet Baruchiel, was a 
commanding woman well known in her community.  She raised eight children, and was 
often overflowing with breast milk.  Jerusalem was very poor in those days, and many 
mothers did not have enough food to give their children.  Many babies even died of 
starvation.  Yochevet would gladly share her breast milk, nursing both Arab and Jewish 
babies on a regular basis.  Like most Jerusalemites in the Old City, Arabs and Jews would 
live in mixed neighbourhoods, and interact on a daily basis as friends, neighbours, 
business partners, and even lovers.  My grandmother tells me that her aunt’s story is not 
unique, and that many women shared their breast milk, whether an Arab mother with a 
Jewish baby, or vice-versa.  This story leaves the most powerful impact on my soul, and 
brings tears to my eyes.  “If we can share breast milk, we can certainly share land”, I 
think aloud.  My grandmother also tells me that Arab women had the best reputation as 
midwives in Jerusalem, and were often found delivering Jewish babies into the world.  
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This was not a business relationship, as commonly understood today, but a matter of a 
neighbour or friend helping with the birth process.  I think of all the Jewish babies who 
came into this world with an Arab hand, and smile.34     
 
 The religious quarters of Jerusalem were not always well defined in the city’s 
history.  No official Jewish quarter existed in 16th century Jerusalem, and Jews lived 
largely mixed with their Arab neighbours in all but one section of the city.35  Some Arab 
and Jewish homes had no real separation between one another, and children could often 
enter a neighbour’s home by mistake.36  As historian Amnon Cohen highlights, “A 
property [in 16th century Jerusalem] was not necessarily owned by a single person or 
even a single family: often one part of a house was sold to one person, another part to 
someone else.  Jews usually sold to Jews, but occasionally the buyer was a Muslim, 
resulting in joint Jewish-Muslim ownership of a property.”37  Records also reveal some 
40 different houses and rooms rented by Muslims to Jews in 16th century Jerusalem.  
There are also examples of Muslims renting from Jews, although this was less common.38      
 The 17th and 18th century saw Palestine as a neglected Ottoman district, as local 
governors became more independent of central control, and were prone to corruption and 
mismanagement of their duties.  Public works were not carried out, agriculture and trade 
declined, and the majority of the population were impoverished and oppressed.39  The 
ruling Turkish minority treated the average Arab Muslim almost as poorly as they did any 
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other minority.  This, coupled with a series of natural disasters, left Jewish centres like 
Safad and Tiberias utterly depopulated.40  Safad was the most populous Jewish centre 
until 1837, when another major earthquake forced many of its inhabitants to head for 
Jerusalem.  By 1839, Jerusalem had 5,000 Jews, Safad 1,500, Hebron 750, and Tiberias 
600.  Smaller centres of Jewish life included the three sea-coast towns of Akko, Haifa 
and Jaffa, which accommodated about 400 Jews, and the city of Nablus with about 150.  
An estimated 400 Jews remained in other Palestinian villages.  This gives a total of about 
10,000 Jews in Palestine by the year 1839, roughly the same number living there during 
the first 50 years of Ottoman rule.41  By 1839, the entire population of Palestine was 
between 300,000- 400,000 people.42   
 
 Ibrahim Abu El-Hawa, born, raised, and still living in Mount of Olives, 
Jerusalem, invites me to his home.  I first met Ibrahim at a peace gathering event several 
years ago, where he spoke of the importance of bringing together Arabs and Jews for 
authentic contact and dialogue.  Ibrahim embodies his talk by opening his home to guests 
from all over, especially welcoming Israelis and Jews to visit his Palestinian 
neighbourhood.  He insists on picking me up from Damascus Gate, and we slowly make 
our way to a house he is constructing for his family and to welcome more guests.  
Ibrahim explains that his parents and grandparents instilled in him the tradition of 
coexistence by keeping their house open to anyone who needed a place to rest, regardless 
of their religious or cultural background.  His grandfather worked in the local Jewish 
cemetery where he had 14 donkeys that delivered stones from neighbouring communities.  
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His father also worked in the Jewish cemetery until 1948.  Ibrahim, born in 1942, recalls 
his father’s many Jewish friends, who would often come for dinner.  He speaks of a time 
when the deep divisions between Arab and Jew did not exist, and how well these two 
peoples got along on so many levels.  We make our way back to his current home, where 
the walls of his guesthouse are draped in peace stickers and messages of reconciliation.  
A young Jewish Israeli man has been living there for close to a year, active in the local 
community and with peace building projects.  Ibrahim tells me that hundreds, if not 
thousands, of people have stayed here, and that his work is to promote Arab-Jewish 
reconciliation by bringing people together.  Ibrahim says he would like to support a 
similar-type guesthouse to be constructed in the Jewish part of Jerusalem, welcoming 
people from all over at no cost, including Palestinian Muslims like himself.  Somehow I 
think his vision is not so unrealistic, even in these turbulent times.43 
 
 The Ottomans began to take more notice of Palestine in the mid 19th century, after 
Egypt started to assert its independence from their control, along with strong Anglo-
French strategic interest to control the Suez isthmus.  The sanjak (district) of Jerusalem 
suddenly became more important to the Turks, and was closely monitored by 
Constantinople.  Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, who began to rule the Ottoman Empire in the 
late 19th century, invested a lot of his energy in transforming Palestine through enhanced 
communications, education, roadways, and transportation systems.  He ordered an 
increased military presence in the region to strengthen his control.  He even allowed a 
European company to construct a railroad between Jerusalem and Jaffa in 1892, and then 
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between Haifa and Deraa (Transjordan) in 1905.  The consequence of this rapid 
modernization plan was an increased presence of European influence in Palestine.44   
 Increased trade and globalization led to a dramatic shift in the Palestinian 
economy, especially for fellahin (peasants) and the rural farming population.  The 
introduction of monetization, coupled with heavy money-lending, led to mass indebtness 
of the rural population.  Many landowners were forced to give up their lands, and become 
tenants on their ancestral farms.  A growing gap between the poor and wealthy led to a 
marked decline in small and medium sized properties, an increase in land prices, and a 
rise in huge estates.  Europeans of all types also began to settle in Palestine, and as 
Ottoman control weakened, several European nations claimed special rights to West Asia 
as “protectors” of the European settlers living there.45   
 In the meantime, growing anti-Jewish pogroms in Eastern Europe and Russia led 
about 50,000 European Jews to immigrate to Palestine between 1882 and the beginning 
of the First World War.46  Many Palestinians greeted this influx as an extension of 
European interference with the local economy and culture.  These immigrants were 
perceived as part of the major change and disruption resulting from European colonialism 
and trade.  This hostility was not directed at native Palestinian Jews, the majority of who 
were Sephardim (of Spanish ancestry) and Mizrahim (of West Asian and North African 
ancestry), and were seen as part of the cultural landscape.47  Documents from early 19th 
century Palestine reveal that a number of Jews and Arabs formed partnerships, as brokers 
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in wheat or livestock, or joint businesses like a local dairy.48  The Ashkenazi (of European 
ancestry) Jews coming to settle in Palestine embodied an entirely different culture that 
was foreign to the Arabs and Jews of the region.  Growing European interventionism, 
occupation, and oppression would eventually replace the existing Ottoman regime by the 
end of the First World War49.  Growing anti-Jewish oppression in Europe would also 
mean an emerging Jewish desire to find refuge in Palestine.  A series of events and 
factors, not to mention British promises of nationhood to both Palestinians and Zionists, 
would spark a now century-old conflict. 
 
 Margalete Ben-Ezer, and her sister Esther Malki, greet me with open arms as I 
make my way up the staircase to Margalete’s apartment.  This exchange is particularly 
emotional for me, as these women are blood relatives that I have never met before.  A 
large tray of food is ready for our meeting, and the stories I am about to hear will teach 
me about my ancestry, and more about Arab-Jewish Relations in early 20th century 
Jerusalem.  These are the daughters of Yochevet Baruchiel, my grandmother’s aunt 
mentioned earlier in this chapter.  Yochevet was a folk healer, wet nurse, and all-around 
old school Jerusalemite.  With her passing several years ago, her children are the gateway 
to the memories, stories, and traditions she imparted.  They are both eager to share their 
early impressions of Jerusalem with me, and impressed with the topic of my thesis.  
Margalete, born 1930 in Jerusalem (same year, city, and first name as my grandmother), 
remembers many good things about the way Arabs and Jews got along.  Both her and 
Esther grew up in Givat Shauel, just minutes away from the neighbouring Arab village of 
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Deir Yassin.  She tells me of the warmth and trust between these communities, and the 
many rituals they shared throughout the year.  Margalete remembers going to Deir Yassin 
every Purim (a Jewish holiday) and trying on dresses the villagers would give her.  She 
remembers the celebration at the end of Pessach (Passover), as Deir Yassin villagers 
would bring large platters of food to Givat Shauel residents as a token of friendship.  The 
Jews of Givat Shauel would offer Passover matzas (unleavened bread) to the Arabs, who 
gladly accepted.  Relations were so good that some Jews even lived on the outskirts of 
Deir Yassin, as one of their aunts did.  Margalete and Esther speak of the tradition of 
sharing breast milk between mothers, and how ethnicity or religion would play no part in 
this.  Their mother took part in this tradition, and supposedly had very rich milk.  They 
remember house courtyards that Jews and Arabs shared, sitting together and living in the 
same compound.  Even more fascinating are the stories of mixed Arab-Jewish marriages 
that were common in Jerusalem, especially in the area of Karen Ha’Temanee (Yemenite 
Quarter).  They explain that it was very common to find a Jewish woman marrying an 
Arab man, but very uncommon for an Arab woman to marry a Jewish man.  As I already 
knew, there is even one such occurrence in our family, as one of Yochevet’s sisters 
married an Arab man from Egypt.  I brought up the topic of Deir Yassin once again, and 
of the terrible massacre that was committed there by Jewish militants in 1948.  Margalete 
looked up at me and told me about the pain in her heart when she heard about what 
happened there.  It was so obvious that she cared deeply about the people there.50     
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These histories and stories highlight some of the rich and meaningful shared 
experiences between Arabs and Jews in historical Palestine over the last 500 years.  They 
can be used to renew the tradition of cooperative coexistence by teaching us about 
ancestry, culture, and custom.  Arabs and Jews are not starting from scratch, and these 
memories can be treated like ancient recipes, many of which offer valuable tips and clues, 
even if the ingredients are outdated or unavailable.  These stories also highlight some of 
the injustices and animosities between these peoples, including the second-class status of 
the Jews.  In moving towards a model for genuine cooperative coexistence in 
Israel/Palestine today, it is overly simplistic and dangerous to default to nostalgic 
interpretations of the past, or promote “a return” to the way things were.  Any reading of 
the history informs us that relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine were far from 
perfect, although considerably better than that between Israelis and Palestinians today.  
Modern realities have also changed the collective needs and aspirations of both Arabs 
and Jews, and changes in national identity, technology, communications, and other areas 
places cooperative coexistence in a different context than during Ottoman times.  In 
awakening these historical seeds, our next step involves creating a critical analysis that 
does look to the available ‘ingredients’ of today, challenging us to find new tools and 
devices to heal and transform modern Arab-Jewish relations in Israel/Palestine. 
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Chapter Three 
A Critical Analysis: 
Arab-Jewish Cooperative Coexistence In Israel/Palestine Today 
 
 Pioneer peace researcher and educator Johan Galtung defines one type of 
coexistence as “an agreement between parties to proceed on parallel tracks, each within 
its own dialectic.”51  While this definition may be seen as a progressive step forward 
between warring parties, this thesis argues that a long-term, viable, warm peace is best 
sustained by joint efforts that bring people together for social, cultural, political, 
economic, and other interests.  In the case of Arab-Jewish Relations in historical 
Palestine over the last 500 years, there existed a considerable level of cooperation and 
interdependence in areas like housing, business, and cultural/social activity.  At the same 
time, structural realities promoted segregation in other areas like the legal system, public 
facilities, and the minority status of the Jews.   
There exists a range of assumptions about what cooperative coexistence is, and 
failure to understand this point is bound to result in further confusion.  Indeed, many 
Arab-Jewish coexistence programs today have failed their participants because of a lack 
of understanding about dynamics and structures.  In many cases, programs have been 
created with little or no input from the diversity of groups they are meant to be serving.  
Some critics observe that many of these initiatives do more harm than good by preaching 
the principles of equality and pluralism, while consecutively promoting an agenda of 
assimilation. 
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The Work of Mohammed Abu-Nimer 
 
 One of the leading scholars in the area of Arab-Jewish Encounter Programs in 
Israel is Professor Mohammed Abu-Nimer, a Palestinian citizen of Israel lecturing at 
American University in Washington DC.  Professor Abu-Nimer is both a supporter and 
critic of many Arab-Jewish coexistence and encounter programs, and has conducted 
numerous studies into their dynamics and effectiveness.  His most exhaustive work on the 
subject is presented in his book Dialogue, Conflict Resolution, and Change: Arab-Jewish 
Encounters In Israel (1999).  Looking at six different encounter programs in Israel, he 
probes each one in-depth and from a variety of angles.  His conclusions suggest that the 
most established and popular coexistence programs in Israel seriously fail to address the 
needs of their participants, and often reinforce tensions by ignoring essential issues at the 
heart of the conflict.  He suggests a critical re-evaluation of these programs and their 
most basic premises.52   
Abu-Nimer brings up the whole idea of ‘Contact Hypothesis Theory’, a central 
concept in modern inter-group relations.  This theory states that bringing people together 
to increase interpersonal relations will affect changes in attitudes and opinions of one 
another.  Contact Hypothesis Theory comes largely out of the human relations movement 
that arose after the Second World War.53  Modern psychology is largely rooted in this 
understanding, and the premise of many therapy and support groups rest on this theory.54  
With respect to Arab-Jewish encounter groups, Abu-Nimer says that the focus on 
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individual psychology may be unable to affect significant changes at the macro level, 
where the roots of the problem may be.55  Furthermore, Arabs and Jews in Israel vary 
significantly in the modes of interaction they are accustomed to via their cultural context.  
Arab culture tends to stress the value of interaction ritual, in which acts towards the 
subject is held in high esteem.  Jewish culture in Israel tends to adopt more of a direct 
manner of interaction and individual self-expression.56  Abu-Nimer notes that all of the 
encounter programs he studied overlook this fact, and facilitators bring in the Occidental 
techniques of “emotional clarification”, where a participant is expected to expose herself 
to others.  Since this is not intrinsic in Arab culture, which looks more to collective 
processes, many Arabs in these encounter groups come off as more polite and less direct 
in the encounters, which makes them appear more suspicious to the Jewish participants.57  
 Abu-Nimer points out that many encounter groups in Israel consider themselves 
to be apolitical, and avoid political discussion as a rule.  The focus is on personal and 
cultural acquaintance, with the final goal of looking for common ground and focusing on 
similarities and solutions.58  Skipping the political discussion phase, “the problem” is 
framed as a lack of communication between Arabs and Jews, or a misunderstanding of 
culture and identity.  It is assumed that once these problems are cleared up, both groups 
can move forward towards coexistence and peaceful relations.59  Abu-Nimer’s research 
reveals that many of the participants, intervenors, and facilitators of these programs do 
not believe that the main issues of the conflict are dealt with in these programs.60  In fact, 
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this leads him to ask if these programs act as a way to relieve the Jewish participants guilt 
at being associated with the oppressor group, while providing the Arab participants a 
release-valve at feelings of political and structural disempowerment.61  At the same time, 
Abu-Nimer stresses the value of encounter programs as the only opportunity for Arabs to 
interact with Jewish Israelis without being accused, feared, or humiliated, and for Jewish 
participants as a safe space to look deeply at the culture and perceptions of Arabs.62   
The Ministry of Education, a branch of the Israeli government, funds many of the 
largest encounter and coexistence programs in Israel.  This subjects these programs to the 
Ministry’s inspection, policy, and authority, and creates an immediate bias because of the 
link to Israeli government policy.63  Many critics ask if coexistence is being used as a tool 
for cooptation of the Arab population in Israel.  Abu-Nimer asks if such programs are a 
clever attempt at making Zionism more palatable to Arabs living in Israel by presenting 
the universal face of Israel.64  He critiques that many of these programs seek to increase 
the Israeli identity of the Arabs participants, while decreasing their national Palestinian or 
religious identity.  In fact, all of the programs Abu-Nimer studied use Hebrew as the 
spoken language in the encounter, generally meet in a Jewish space, and have more 
Jewish involvement at the leadership level.65  As political discussion is restricted, the 
question of the legitimacy of a Jewish State as opposed to a state of its citizens is not 
broached, which places the assumption of Israel being a “Jewish, pluralistic, and 
democratic State with equal civic rights” on the Arab participants.66  The inherent 
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assumptions in this definition are not discussed.  There is even a history in Israel of some 
dialogue organizations being run by ruling political parities to mobilize political support 
among the Arab minority.67   
 In her work on majority-minority interethnic dialogue, researcher Amy S. 
Hubbard concludes that participants from each group view dialogue differently.  She 
states, “Majority participants are more likely to approach dialogue with an interest in 
communicating with minority participants.  Minority participants are more likely to 
expect political action to come out of their dialogue efforts.”68  She defines ‘majority 
participants’ as those “whose people or community or nation are in the relatively more 
powerful position”, whereas ‘minority participants’ are in the relatively less powerful 
position.69  She also discovered that majority participants are more likely to view the 
Race Relations process in the context of ‘conflict resolution’, whereas minority 
participants are far more drawn to the ‘social justice’ framework.70  The first context 
suggests that everyone must change in some way to bring about peaceful relations, 
whereas the latter approach suggests that peaceful relations can best be accomplished if 
the majority group changes their ways and justice is brought forward.71 
When determining what “success” means in many of the encounter and 
coexistence programs that Abu-Nimer studied, participants often had very different ideas.  
He found that many Arab participants define “success” as reaching an agreement on a 
conflict issue, convincing the Jewish participants of their ideas, and building friendships, 
in that order.  Many Jewish participants define “success” as building a friendship, having 
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fun, and getting to know the Arabs better, in that order.72  Again, the majority of these 
programs are designed to facilitate success based on the Jewish participant’s perspectives, 
reflecting the asymmetry at the organizational/leadership level of the program. 
  In approaching cooperative coexistence in Israel/Palestine, separating the 
political context from the personal context directly favours the majority participants by 
protecting the status quo and its inherent structural imbalances.  Abu-Nimer’s work 
suggests that schools in Israel have become social agencies supporting and preserving 
government policy by implementing encounter programs void of any political discussion.  
An even greater risk is the promotion of non-critical and non-analytical thinking skills 
when designing and implementing encounter programs.  Abu-Nimer says, “An effective 
encounter program is one that is able to provide its participants with critical analytical 
skills to understand and systematically analyze the structural as well as perceived causes 
of a conflict situation.  To do so, the model of coexistence program should focus on 
power imbalance analysis, too.”73  Many coexistence and encounter programs in Israel 
today are designed with the perception that stereotypes, miscommunication, and 
interpersonal experiences are the sources of the conflict.  As long as these assumptions go 
unquestioned, and terms defined only by the majority group, cooperative coexistence will 
never develop into a relationship based on equality, pluralism, and all of the values many 
proponents claim to espouse.   
Abu-Nimer recommends some major changes to the way encounter programs are 
designed and implemented in Israel.  Among these recommendations are that directors 
and decision-makers be both Jewish and Arab, both having equal influence in shaping the 
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program.  As well, funding and financial support for programs should come from both 
Arab and Jewish communities, even if the Arab resources are often restricted or scarce.  
When it comes to accepting government support and funding, any conditions that 
influence or limit the decisions of the program should be rejected.74   
While Abu-Nimer’s bias is obviously geared toward the Palestinian side, his work 
becomes important in clarifying majority-minority dynamics, and advocating programs 
that look to meet some neglected and overlooked needs of participants.  I have focused 
highly on his work so as to include a Palestinian-centered perspective on coexistence 
programs, which is often missing in a Jewish led field in Israel.  In implementing his 
recommendations and insights, it is important not to do so at the expense of the Jewish 
participant’s established needs, or risk creating a reverse vacuum effect.  Politicizing the 
encounter, a major need for Arab participants, must be done in a way that does not cancel 
out the major Jewish need for personal relationship building and cultural acquaintance.   
 
Understanding The Political & Social Contexts 
 
 In looking at cooperative coexistence initiatives in Israel/Palestine today, 
understanding the political and social context is essential to informing a critical analysis.  
Without this basic understanding, efforts become divorced from current realities, and the 
ability to perceive the needs and responses of participants become more difficult.  At 
present, Israel has been militarily occupying both the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 
1967, protecting a series of Jewish settlements built there.  Over three million 
Palestinians live under Israeli occupation daily, and this involves regular curfews, 
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checkpoints, and other harsh measures imposed on the entire Palestinian people.  West 
Bank and Gaza Palestinians are restricted from entering Israel proper, and Israeli law 
currently prohibits any Israeli citizen from traveling to these Territories.75  This makes 
the prospects for joint Arab-Jewish initiatives in the West Bank and Gaza very difficult, 
if not nearly impossible at points. 
Also, Israel defines itself as a Jewish State, while about 20% of the population is 
Arab.76  This includes Palestinian, Druze, and Bedouin communities.  On the whole, 
Arabs living in Israel are subjected to a range of discriminatory policies, especially in the 
area of land ownership, where non-Jews are limited from leasing lands.77  The education 
system in Israel is highly segregated, with both Jewish and Arab schools.78  Further, Arab 
communities, towns, and cities generally receive much lower levels of government 
services and resources.79  These imbalances in government policy make mixed housing 
communities a challenge to set-up, with only one known running project at present.80   
Jews are coming out of the most gruesome period in their history, where acts of 
genocide claimed six million Jewish lives throughout Europe some 60 years ago.  This, 
coupled with thousands of years of oppression at the hands of majority groups, has 
spurred many Jewish people to seek self-determination in their own national homeland.  
Anti-Jewish racism has not ceased, continuing to rear its ugly head in many parts of the 
world today.  Ongoing persecution and genocide transformed the collective Jewish 
psyche, as Jews gathered to find a refuge where they could be safe and determine their 
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own affairs.  While many Jews continue to live outside of the State of Israel, the large 
majority supports political Zionism, the idea of a Jewish State. 
Arabs are coming out of hundreds of years of colonialism at the hands of foreign 
powers that often abused and violated them in many different forms.  In the process of 
shaking off colonialist influence, Zionism brought hundreds of thousands of European 
Jews to settle in Palestine at the same time it was under British military occupation.  
These settlers came with an ideology to erect a Jewish State in Palestine, and overlooked 
the fact that there were other people living there.  The famous Zionist slogan, “A land 
without a people for a people without a land” ignored the existence of Palestinians.  The 
Zionist movement remained largely ignorant of Arab concerns and struggles.  When the 
State of Israel was declared in 1948, over 750,000 Palestinians were uprooted from their 
homes and made refugees.81  This happened again in 1967, when 500,000 more 
Palestinians were forced to flee their villages and dwellings.82  Palestinians and Arabs 
that remained in the newly formed Jewish State lived under military rule from 1948-
1966.83  They continue to live as second-class citizens even today.   
Both peoples are coming from authentic places of concern and need.  Arabs refuse 
to live under military rule, systemic policies of discrimination, and be subject to 
extremely harsh and brutal living conditions.  They refuse to allow Jewish settlers to steal 
their ancestral lands, deplete their water resources, and have preferential status.  The large 
majority of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians are asking for their own self-determination 
in a Palestinian State, and the official position of the Palestinian government is to 
establish a State in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.  Palestinians and 
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Arabs living within Israel are asking to be treated as equal citizens, and not have their 
non-Jewish status held against them in any way.  
 At the same time, most Jewish Israelis remain committed to the idea of a Jewish 
homeland, where they can determine their own affairs and not be subject to majority rule.  
The memories and traumas of the Holocaust are still fresh in the collective Jewish 
psyche, and Israel is the only country in the world that defines itself as a safe-haven for 
Jews.  Palestinian terror groups like Hamas have targeted and killed Israelis in buses, 
shopping malls, and other public spaces.  Jewish Israelis are determined to live in a safe 
and secure homeland, and the threat of terror attacks makes this impossible for them.   
Efforts at cooperative coexistence must take these realities into account.  Simply 
ignoring the Jewish and Palestinian plights does nothing to heal the roots of the conflict. 
Jewish concerns about security and safety, and Arab concerns about self-determination 
and equality, are crucial in understanding the context of the conflict in Israel/Palestine.  
Coexistence efforts that skip this stage, and do not integrate the social and political 
spheres into their efforts, risk becoming ineffective in meeting their participants needs.  
Jewish concerns about safety and security must not be dismissed as mere “paranoia”, as 
this amounts to insensitivity and devaluation.  Arabs concerns about equality and self-
determination must not be reduced to “propaganda”, as this overlooks fundamental 
structural imbalances and daily realities for many Arabs.   
The three case studies examined in the following chapters are attempting the 
difficult and rewarding task of building bridges between Arab and Jewish communities in 
Israel/Palestine.  They are doing this in ways that are cooperative, democratic, pluralistic, 
and sensitive to both people’s needs.  They have been selected because they most closely 
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reflect the process of renewal, critical analysis, and empowerment cultivated throughout 
this thesis.  Also, these projects span a range of different coexistence areas, from housing, 
to political activism, to education.  In analyzing these projects, I will be looking at the 
strengths and weaknesses of each according to the perspectives and criteria outlined in 
this chapter.  The work of Mohammed Abu-Nimer is of particular value in this analysis, 
as it highlights some major areas of importance in the set-up, design, and implementation 
of Arab-Jewish coexistence programs.  The chart on the next page lists these major areas 
of importance, and will be used to assess each project.  While exploring key elements of 
each case study, the framework of this analysis is meant to be a general overview and 
introduction to using critical thinking skills.  A comprehensive, methodical, and in-depth 
study of each project is beyond the scope of this thesis.  My intention in this exploration 
is to spur the reader’s imagination to begin thinking critically about the future of 
cooperative coexistence efforts in Israel/Palestine, and stimulate dialogue about the issue 
on the whole.  There is no magic formula for “making peace” happen, and none of these 
case studies are presented as the ultimate or definitive answer to the ongoing separation 
between Arabs and Jews in Israel/Palestine. 
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Major Areas of Importance In Assessing & Analyzing Arab-Jewish 
Cooperative Coexistence Programs In Israel/Palestine (Abu-Nimer) 
 
 
Major Area     Factors & Considerations 
 
 
Contact Hypothesis Theory   *Cultural contexts & assumptions 
      *Occidental Vs. Oriental approaches 
      *Modes & models of interaction 
      *Psychological Vs. Structural Approaches 
      *Interaction Ritual Vs. Individual self- 
        expression 
 
Political Vs. Apolitical   *Who defines the terms? 
      *Political/Apolitical assumptions 
      *Relationship to status quo 
      *How is the conflict framed? 
 
Majority Vs. Minority    *Different needs of participants? 
      *What is “success” and who defines it? 
      *Zionism & Jewish State assumed? 
      *Political & other influences? 
      *Neutral space?  Arab/Jewish space? 
 
Language     *Symmetry/Asymmetry in language? 
      *Hebrew as the main language? 
      *Translation?   
 
Leadership, Facilitation &    *Arab/Jewish symmetry at leadership level? 
Decision-Making    *Organizational structure? 
      *How are decisions made? 
      *Mandates/mission statement/goals? 
 
Funding     *Subjected to evaluation/critique/ethics? 
      *Political influence(s) of funding sources? 
      *Conditions/restrictions of funding sources? 
      *Balance between Arab/Jewish sources? 
      *Hidden agendas? 
 
Critical/Analytical Thinking Skills  *Developed or repressed? 
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Chapter Four 
Rekindling The Fires: Three Case Studies 
 
 
(1) Hand In Hand: The Center For Bilingual Education In Israel 
 
 Lee Gordon and Amin Khalaf began with a simple yet profound vision: to bring 
together Jewish and Arab children for desegregated, bilingual education in Israel.  Eight 
years since the founding of their organization, Hand In Hand: The Center For Bilingual 
Education in Israel, hundreds of children have been educated in the organizations three 
schools.  Gordon and Khalaf, citizens of Israel of Jewish and Arab origin, set out with a 
mission “to catalyze the creation of a network of integrated schools around the country, 
providing Jewish and Arab parents the option to send their children to schools where they 
can learn and interact with all their neighbours.”84  The Israeli education system 
continues to be highly divided along ethnic lines, with Jewish schools receiving 
significantly more money and resources per student.  Human Rights Watch reports that 
Arab schools in Israel are often overcrowded, understaffed, poorly built, badly 
maintained, or simply unavailable.85  In looking for receptive communities to host Hand 
In Hand, the city of Jerusalem and the Regional Council of Misgav, along with the Arab 
town of Sakhnin and the village of Shaab, were all interested in working to help open a 
school.86   
 Hand In Hand opened its first two schools in September 1998, with 20 
kindergarten level children in Jerusalem, and 25 first-graders in the Upper Galilee.  These 
were Israel’s first bilingual schools implemented in mixed residential areas.  Only one 
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other such school, Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salaam, existed in an isolated community 
ideologically identified with promoting Israeli-Palestinian coexistence.  Currently in their 
sixth year of operation, the Jerusalem school boasts 11 classes, starting from junior 
kindergarten to grade six, while the school in the Upper Galilee has expanded to include a 
junior high school program.  In September 2004, a third school opened in the Wadi Ara 
region of Israel, with 100 students ranging from kindergarten to grade three.  Over 500 
students currently attend Hand in Hand’s three schools.87          
The schools are set-up so that each has two principals, one Arab and one Jewish, 
as well as two teachers per class, also one Arab and one Jewish.  The student body is 
divided roughly to contain half Arabs and half Jews.  Mixed classes offer a bilingual, 
multicultural, and egalitarian learning environment, with emphasis on symmetry between 
Hebrew and Arabic in all aspects of instruction.  This is accomplished by having the two 
homeroom teachers speak their mother tongue, interacting with each other, elaborating 
each other’s sentences, and offering no translation.  The children are encouraged to reply 
in whatever language they feel comfortable using.  All aspects of the curriculum are 
taught in both Hebrew and Arabic, with teacher’s focusing on equal language use, and 
making sure the children understand the content.  The visual school environment is also 
bilingual, including the books, signs, letters, computer keyboards, and numbers 
displayed.88       
School policies and decision-making practices are made in local school steering 
committees, which are made up of the two principals, parents, and government education 
representatives, who all meet once a month.  Hand In Hand is recognized by the Israeli 
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Ministry of Education as a nonreligious public school system, and is funded in the same 
way as other nonreligious public schools.  The Israeli Ministry of Education has separate 
departments for Arab and Jewish schools, each having its own curricula.  Hand In Hand 
is developing its own unique curriculum by drawing from both streams.89  
Aside from language and curriculum challenges, bringing together peoples with 
very different and often opposing historical narratives has also proved to be a complex 
task.  Holidays like Israel’s Independence Day, marked with celebration by many Jews, is 
marked as the Nakba, or Day of Catastrophe, by many Palestinians.  Committed to 
multicultural education, the school has decided to mark both events by holding separate 
ceremonies, one for Jews and one for Arabs.  This is supplemented with in-class 
discussions between all students, exploring the sensitive subject matter by presenting a 
plurality of historical narratives.90  Another related internal conflict arose when 
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat passed away in 2004.  Many of the school’s Jewish 
parents objected to any commemoration of Arafat, while many Palestinian parents felt it 
was very important to commemorate him.  After much heightened emotion and 
disagreement, it was decided to compromise by placing some photos of Arafat in one 
corner of the school, allowing anybody who wished to pay tribute.91           
Hebrew University ethnography researcher Zvi Beckerman spent two years 
researching Hand In Hand schools, conducting over 120 interviews with parents, staff, 
and students.  This research included sitting in on numerous classes, attending all school 
events, and recording all steering committee meetings.  His conclusions reveal that while 
the organization is making a serious, committed, and sustained effort at bilingual 
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education in Israel, symmetry has not yet been achieved.  Palestinian teachers were found 
to be fluent in both Hebrew and Arabic, while their Jewish counterparts had only a very 
limited, if any, knowledge of Arabic.  Students generally preferred to interact with 
teachers and other students of their own national background.  Students also generally 
used Hebrew when in a mixed group, even when the majority of children were 
Palestinian.  Beckerman’s study reveals that based on the children’s language 
proficiencies, bilingual instruction was more successful among Palestinian students.  
Hebrew was also the dominant language during teacher interactions, at teacher’s 
meetings, training sessions, parents meetings, and steering committee meetings.92            
Ala Khatib, one of the Jerusalem school principals, admits his school still has a 
ways to go in achieving a fully bilingual school environment.  He is committed to the 
objective, though, and believes it is within reach.  He points to the school’s rapid 
expansion in the course of a few short years, with more kindergarten classes than ever 
before at his school, including the addition of a junior high program planned for next 
year.  I ask him about the curriculum, and how the school contends with some of the 
challenges around devising an integrated Arab-Jewish approach.  He replies that staff in 
his school work extra-hard by not only integrating the regular, standardized curriculum 
streams, but also going beyond it to incorporate a bi-national, multicultural, and bilingual 
approach that aims for balance and inclusivity.  He says that the greatest challenge facing 
the school is to finish and finalize the curriculum.93             
 If stories make memory, then languages give meaning.  Ethnographer Zvi 
Beckerman explains that languages “produce and express identity, create connectedness 
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in political and social communities, and are consequential in the marketplace.”94  Hand In 
Hand has taken on an extraordinary task in the midst of renewed sociopolitical unrest.  A 
quick cross-reference with the chart on page 40 indicates that the organization seems to 
be making notable headway in the creation and promotion of multiculturalism, pluralism, 
and bilingual education in Israel.  This is evidenced not only by its rapid growth, 
expansion and popularity among Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel, but also by its 
inclusive decision-making process, which sees joint Arab-Jewish leadership and 
symmetry at the internal level.  Critical analytical thinking skills also seem to be 
encouraged and developed through open forums, input from parents and administrators, 
and engaging students to question and examine socio-cultural assumptions and narratives.  
Where Hand In Hand falls short, though, is in its failure to meet its own goal of a fully 
bilingual educational institution.  Arabic continues to be a secondary language, even after 
continued attempts to balance the dynamic by applying “affirmative action” approaches 
to its use in the schools.  In fairness, the current sociopolitical realities in Israel make it 
extremely difficult to promote Arabic as a central language.  Hebrew far outweighs 
Arabic in its use in the workplace and in economic spheres in Israeli society.  
Nevertheless, by creating one of the first comprehensive models for bilingual education 
in Israel, the prospects for a truly multicultural, pluralistic, and inclusive society are 
already underway.  
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(2) Ta’ayush: Arab-Jewish Partnership 
 
 Arabic for “living together”, Ta’ayush came about in the autumn of 2000, 
following Ariel Sharon’s controversial visit to the Temple Mount with 1,000 police 
officers, and the ensuing violence that erupted thereafter.  Started by both Jewish and 
Arab peace activists living in Israel, this grassroots, nonviolent, direct action organization 
has two main goals: an end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
and full equality and civil rights for all of Israel’s citizens.  With no set ideological 
doctrine or manifesto, Ta’ayush prides itself on being a joint Arab-Jewish movement 
invested in nonviolent direct action as its main focus.  In its short history, the group has 
captured headlines by coordinating bold and symbolic actions aimed at challenging the 
status quo, and drawing attention to issues conveniently overlooked by the mainstream 
Israeli public and press.95 
Ta’ayush’s first major public action, beginning in December 2000, was 
organizing convoys of food and medicines to besieged Palestinian villages in the 
Occupied Territories. These convoys were led by Ta’ayush activists directly, in trucks 
and private vehicles, and implemented more as a solidarity action with a humanitarian 
tone.  The police and army had a difficult time explaining why they would wish to 
prevent aid from getting through.  More than ten such convoys reached Palestinian 
communities in the midst of renewed war and violence, providing essential relief.  
Thousands of Israelis crossed checkpoints and barriers, exposing themselves to the daily 
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realities of occupation, seeing first-hand the impact of roadblocks, settler-only highways, 
military abuse and harassment.96   
 What makes the organization unique is its rejection of hierarchal leadership 
structures, and its commitment to inclusive, process-oriented decision-making.  Working 
committees open to all members come up with ideas for actions and projects.  These 
ideas are taken to general meetings where they are discussed, and then either approved or 
rejected.  Decision-making is done through consensus, and supposedly actions are 
rejected if even one member objects strongly.  Leadership roles are shared, and there is 
no formal leadership level.  As an Arab-Jewish movement, everybody is encouraged to 
use their own mother tongue, and the meetings are held in both Arabic and Hebrew with 
the use of a volunteer translator.  In reality, the conversation usually defaults to Hebrew 
when there is no translator available, as most of the Jewish members do not speak Arabic, 
while many of the Arabic members speak Hebrew.97   As part of the organizations 
attempt to be non-patronizing, all actions are done together with the community Ta’ayush 
is working with.98     
 After a year of continuing to lead food and medicine solidarity convoys, the 
situation became more complicated as the army closed off more roads in the Occupied 
Territories.  This did not stop Ta’ayush from working with the half-nomadic, indigenous 
cave-dwelling inhabitants of the South Hebron Hills region, who were being forcefully 
driven and expelled from their dwellings by Israeli settlers and army.  Ta’ayush members 
acted as a protective human chain so that the expelled inhabitants could return to their 
dwellings.  This proved successful, as they did manage to return.  Ta’ayush continues to 
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work closely with these people, monitoring the situation regularly.  With ongoing 
regional instability and decay, Ta’ayush actions in the Occupied Territories faced harsher 
resistance from the Israeli army.  One demonstration at A-Ram checkpoint, which 
brought together over 3,000 people from a range of groups to protest the occupation and 
deliver a relief convoy, was tear-gassed and violently dispersed.  Still, the humanitarian 
supplies managed to get through to Ramallah.  Not all future convoys were as lucky, 
though, with some held-up for days or even denied altogether.99   
 In recent years, Ta’ayush has moved away from solidarity convoys, which can be 
seen to weaken the political message.  The main focus now is on the separation wall 
being constructed in the West Bank, and trying to stop it.  This wall has been a grave 
source of land confiscation, entrapment, and ghettoization for many Palestinians.  Aside 
from educating the Israeli public on the impact of the wall, Ta’ayush activists have taken 
part in numerous demonstrations with West Bank Palestinians leading nonviolent 
movements against it.  One such demonstration saw over 1,000 Palestinians, Israelis, and 
Internationals gather in the West Bank last August 2004, with speeches from Mahmoud 
Abbas, the current Palestinian President, and Dr. Arun Gandhi, the grandson of the late 
Mahatma Gandhi.  In some cases, such resistances have worked in pressuring the Israeli 
government to change the route of the wall closer to Israel’s own borders.  Ta’ayush is 
working closely with several other Israeli and Palestinian peace groups on this campaign, 
including Gush Shalom, The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, and the 
villagers of numerous West Bank Palestinian villages.100  
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 Leena Dallasheh, a highly active Palestinian member of Ta’ayush, joined the 
organization in the autumn of 2001.  She explains some of the challenges facing 
Palestinian members of Ta’ayush, and how they are being addressed.  On a practical and 
logistical level, it is generally more difficult for Palestinians to come to meetings, as they 
usually take place in highly Jewish urban centres like Haifa and Tel Aviv.  Palestinian 
women in particular are challenged, as it is custom for them not to travel alone.  To 
remedy this dynamic, some meetings have been moved to Palestinian centres.  Another 
factor in the Arab-Jewish dynamic is that most Ta’ayush actions fall on a Saturday, this 
being the only full day off for many Jewish members.  Some Arab members are 
prevented from attending because they must work on Saturday.  Leena mentions that the 
Arab-Jewish demographic of Ta’ayush is roughly the same, and even slightly higher, than 
the national average: 20% Arab, 80% Jewish.  With regional Ta’ayush groups across 
Israel, including Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem, the group can claim no more than 
between 1,000-1,500 active members, and generally manages to get a few hundred 
members out to regular actions.  What appeals to Leena about the organization is its 
“very fluid dynamic” that lets individual members make their own personal decisions 
about what they feel comfortable doing, and the fact that Palestinian concerns and input 
are taken seriously.  Indeed, the idea of an Arab-Jewish movement in Israel is a totally 
new idea, and a learning process when it comes to working as a joint activist group.101 
Examining the working chart on page 40, it is quite arguable that Ta’ayush is one 
of the best working models for Arab-Jewish cooperative coexistence in Israel/Palestine 
today.  From the decision-making and planning process, to the event level, the group is 
open to challenging itself through an open forum.  Both Jewish and Arab members work 
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closely together, with no set ideological doctrine.  Explicit political goals leave little 
room for confusion about what brings Arabs and Jews together.  Critical and analytical 
thinking skills seem to be encouraged through engaged dialogue and a relatively 
symmetrical power-sharing structure.  Sensitivity is given to the majority-minority 
dynamic, with a willingness to balance asymmetry by focusing closely on Arab and 
Palestinian concerns and needs.   In the words of Azmi Bdeir and Yasmine Halevi, two 
active members of Ta’ayush, “It [the word ‘Ta’ayush’] means living together, struggling 
together against alienation, against the separation wall, discrimination and racism, 
mastery and patronism, humiliation and boycott, exploitation and occupation.”102  This 
expanded definition of the word has brought together Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel 
to challenge their society, and create a working model that seeks to end injustice, while 
promoting power-sharing strategies between Arabs and Jews. 
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(3) Mosaic Communities 
 
 Mosaic Communities arose from the need and vision of desegregated housing 
communities in Israel.  At present, the laws of the State of Israel do not provide equal 
access to housing and land.  The government of Israel controls 93% of the land in the 
State, and leases out to its citizens.103  Arab citizens have very limited access to this land, 
as most communities are segregated through zoning, land use planning regulations, and 
requirements such as army service.104  Mosaic Communities mission statement is to 
“establish integrated housing communities open to all residents of Israel, thus challenging 
housing policies that institutionalize legal segregation.  Mosaic Communities will lease 
and purchase land, facilitate planning, development, and construction of homes.  It will 
also sell or lease the homes, and provide supporting services to communities when they 
are established.”105   
 The idea of Mosaic came about 20 years ago, out of the ashes of the desegregation 
movement happening in the United States.  Mosaic’s founder and current Executive 
Director, Fred Schlomka, was very involved in the movement to buy homes in white 
residential areas, and sell them to black families.  When he came to live in Israel in 1985, 
he had an idea to start a private development company with an interest in affirmative 
action for mixed communities.  It became quickly apparent that a private company would 
not be enough to deal with the institutionalized segregation in Israel.  After meeting and 
discussing with interested Arab and Jewish partners over the course of several years, it 
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was decided that a housing cooperative could best embody the goals and objectives 
envisioned.  A cooperative is a member-run organization that is democratic by nature, 
and can also do business at the same time.106   
 Mosaic Communities officially launched in 2003, with a Board of Directors 
made-up of both Jewish and Arab members and a full-time Executive Director.  During 
the process of being established, it was decided that the city of Ramle would be an 
excellent starting base.  Ramle is a microcosm of the ethnic divide between Arab and Jew 
inside Israel.  Its population now reflects the demographics of the country (20% Arab, 
80% Jewish), and it has become one of the most impoverished locales in Israel.  The low 
standard of living is coupled with a poor history of Arab-Jewish relations, with highly 
segregated sections and a municipal administration favouring the Jewish residents in the 
areas of municipal services, education and housing.107  Based in Ramle, Mosaic 
Communities has developed a youth project that brings together Arab and Jewish 
teenagers for workshops and dialogue on conflict issues.  This includes the use of drama, 
art, and photography, with an upcoming plan to develop a youth training and business 
cooperative.  The youth meet on a regular basis, and both Arabic and Hebrew are spoken, 
with the use of a translator.108 
 The current goals of the organization are to develop a membership base by 
outreaching to the Ramle community.  Already a steering committee of Ramle residents 
has been formed, with the task of deciding how to create the conditions to bring Mosaic 
Communities into their community.  Mosaic’s intention is to spend its first few years of 
development on projects “entailing joint activities and common action by which their 
                                                 
106
 Interview with Fred Schlomka (2005) 
107
 <www.mosaic-coop.org> 
108
 Interview with Fred Schlomka, Executive Director 
 53 
nature generate cooperative narrative, rather than develop the less productive route of 
Arab/Jewish dialog groups.”109  The intention behind this is to begin creating the 
conditions for the establishment of mixed communities in Ramle.  This includes 
expanding the current youth project, deepening the understanding of Arab-Jewish 
demographics in Ramle, and building local contacts.  The youth project in particular is 
meant to become a joint business cooperative and training program that can increase 
economic prosperity in the city, and provide local services for Arabs and Jews in a mixed 
setting.  This includes a variety of courses and services that will be discounted for 
members of Mosaic Communities, with the underlying goal of building a membership 
base.  It is intended that through this unique initiative the larger aims of Mosaic 
Communities will be made known to more Ramle residents.110     
 Mosaic is currently in negotiation with the Anglican Church for the lease of a 
property in downtown Ramle to serve as an administrative and activity facility for the 
organization.  This space will serve as a regular meeting spot for all of the courses and 
services that will be offered as part of Mosaic’s strategic plan. Some of the planned 
activities include additional youth groups, computer training, language classes, 
performing arts, computer/internet access, a barter network, and summer camp.  Some of 
these activities are already available in Ramle, but only within segregated environments.  
These programs will bring the diverse members of the Ramle community together under 
one roof, and expose them to the organization’s values and philosophies.111   
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 The process of registering as a cooperative is subject to stringent government 
rules and regulations in Israel.112  For this reason, Mosaic is still in the process of 
petitioning to be officially registered as a housing cooperative.  Until this happens, the 
organization remains under the sponsorship of AL-BEIT: Association for the Defence of 
Human Rights In Israel.  Its funding currently comes from several sources, with the main 
benefactor being The Green Foundation in New York City.  This private foundation 
awards fellowships to non-profits in their beginning stage, and has provided Mosaic with 
enough funding to hire a full-time Executive Director for three years.  The other main 
backers include The New Israel Fund, a non-profit funding agency with a mandate to 
promote equality and pluralism among all of Israel’s citizens, and The Mennonite Central 
Committee, a religious organization interested in issues around peace and justice.  
Smaller donations come from private individuals and other organizations.  None of these 
donations subject Mosaic Communities to conditions or restrictions in the way it operates 
or implements its mandate.113   
      Mosaic’s first mixed housing community is planned to be ready for occupancy 
in the next five years.  By growing its membership constituency, registering as a 
cooperative, and being in the public eye, the organization is planning to transform from a 
top-down structure to a bottom-up one.  This means that all members will be offered 
participatory planning status, enabling them to shape decisions on the whole.  Once a 
potential building site is secured by Mosaic Communities, it is almost certain to elicit a 
reaction from the government and residents of Ramle, especially through the process of 
applying for development approval.  Mosaic views this as an opportunity to stimulate 
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public debate on the issue of segregation, enhance the visibility of the Ramle project, 
attract more interest in membership, and offer additional public relations opportunities.  
Legal action will be initiated if the authorities reject the development plan.  If the plan is 
approved, however, then the impact on Israel and Ramle would be enormous, as the 
government would have to consider providing services to all of its citizens on an equal 
basis for the first time.  In this way, Mosaic Communities is planning to be a catalyst for 
dramatic social change in Israel.114   
 Based on the working chart on page 40, Mosaic Communities seems to be 
developing in ways that consider power imbalances, looking to correct them.  This is 
evidenced in the use of both Hebrew and Arabic at all levels of operation and 
implementation, and the critical analytical thinking skills cultivated through open forums 
and public consultations.  The organization is still too early in its beginning stages to 
accurately assess some of the deeper dynamics at play, such as the specific needs of its 
participants and their definitions of “success.”  One key challenge is in the organization’s 
own goal of transforming from a top-bottom structure, as it is currently designed, to a 
bottom-up one, where members share power and all decision-making.  This factor may be 
the single most important component to creating an effective program.   
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Afterword 
 
 The revolution towards Arab-Jewish cooperative coexistence in Israel/Palestine is 
underway.  As highlighted in the previous chapter, thousands of Israelis and Palestinians 
are spearheading joint movements aimed at eliminating barriers that keep them apart, 
working together for peace, justice, and reconciliation.  While still small in number and 
size, these people and their projects are the foundations for a future where Arabs and 
Jews live side by side again, in a society grounded in equality, diversity, and mutual 
respect.  It is only in such a context that the term ‘Holy Land’ can be redeemed, so as to 
value the holiness and sacredness of every living thing on its soil. 
 In considering political solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can refer 
once again to the chart on page 40 and ask ourselves if the basic requisites of power-
sharing, joint decision-making, and inclusiveness are being developed and implemented 
in the process of negotiating and formulating a strategy.  Who is making the decisions?  
Do they represent the interests and needs of the majority of their people?  How will this 
solution be implemented to address the needs of both peoples?  Under which conditions 
could a solution work?  These questions are the backbone of devising and executing a 
negotiated political settlement that will actually work for both sides both in the short and 
long term.  The failed Oslo Accord lacked this very thinking, and was especially removed 
from the ordinary lives of many Palestinians it claimed to be serving. 
 I agree wholeheartedly with visionary activist Rabbi Michael Lerner that our 
central goals in this historical moment for Israel/Palestine should be to end the oppression 
of the Palestinian people, and ensure Israel’s survival and security, eliminating terror as a 
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daily reality there.115  Israel’s ongoing military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, coupled with discriminatory policies against Arab citizens of Israel, means that 
Arabs continue to suffer as underdogs.  Jewish realities of the last century have created an 
intense need for a safe and secure homeland, and for self-determination.  The world 
largely failed Jewish refugees seeking to escape genocide and persecution by not 
allowing them entry into their borders.  Israel remains the only place committed to 
embracing Jews from the world over.  So long as anti-Jewish racism continues to rear its 
ugly head, the need for such a homeland remains.  Only in a climate where the pressing 
political needs of both Arabs and Jews are addressed and remedied can cooperative 
coexistence flourish, and move beyond isolated, fringe projects.  While the framework of 
this thesis has been post-nationalist, it is my strong belief that the best way forward for 
Israel and Palestine right now is within the context of a fair and suitable two-state 
solution.  Such a solution that is embraced by a significant majority on both sides will 
help end the pressing and immediate human rights crisis in Palestine vis-à-vis the 
occupation, and ensure Israel’s survival as a democracy.  As life gets better for ordinary 
Palestinians, extremist terror groups like Hamas will find themselves more isolated and 
weakened.  Their ability to carry out deadly terror attacks in Israel will decline.   
 Several detailed and comprehensive two-state peace treaties have been devised 
between Israeli and Palestinian leaders.  The most famous, known as ‘The Geneva 
Accord’, came about after secret negotiations between top Palestinian negotiators and 
senior Israeli leftist politicians.  The agreement has generated much dialogue in Israel and 
Palestine, and received worldwide attention.  The major details are as follows: Israel, for 
its part, withdrawing to pre-1967 borders, with minor border changes in exchange for an 
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equal amount of land on a one-to-one basis.  All Israeli settlers would be returned to 
Israel proper, based on the newly formed borders.  Arab sections of East Jerusalem would 
be handed over to the newly formed Palestinian State, serving as its capital.  West 
Jerusalem would remain the capital of Israel.  An international fund would be established 
to provide compensation for Palestinian refugees uprooted in 1948 and 1967, with no 
significant right of return.  Palestine, for its part, would fully recognize Israel as a Jewish 
homeland, concede any major right of return for Palestinian refugees, and agree to live in 
a demilitarized state.116  The majority of Israelis and Palestinians today support a 
negotiated settlement to their differences based on a two-state solution compromise.117  
The Geneva Accord puts forward just such a compromise, and has gained notable support 
among both the Palestinian and Israeli public since it was announced in November 2003.  
While the Palestinian government has been open to it, the current Ariel Sharon 
government has rejected it outright.118 
 From the perspective of Arab-Jewish cooperative coexistence, The Geneva 
Accord lacks a strategy to transform the hearts and minds of Israelis and Palestinians, so 
that a lasting peace can be better embraced and facilitated by ordinary people.  Rabbi 
Michael Lerner advocates some concrete and immediate steps both Israelis and 
Palestinians can take to initiate a citizen-based peace movement.  On the Israeli side, he 
calls for a far-reaching campaign to collect and deliver food and other necessary supplies 
to the Palestinian people currently living in refugee camps.  This includes sending 
medical care and services to refugee camps, a “peace corps” of volunteers dedicated to 
improving quality of life for Palestinians living under occupation.  He also calls for 
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Israelis to invite Arabs, Muslims, and Palestinians to their homes, and get to know 
them.119  Lerner calls for more Palestinians to speak out against violence and terrorism 
directed at Israelis, recognizing their humanity.  He calls for a mass non-violent 
Palestinian movement aimed at ending the occupation.120   
Arab and non-Jewish citizens of Israel must also be ensured full civil rights, 
including equal economic entitlements to any Israeli who has served in the army.  Israel’s 
commitment to Jewish self-determination must not interfere with the rights of its non-
Jewish citizens.  Many would argue that this is impossible, since the idea of a Jewish 
State is by default discriminatory to non-Jews.  I would respond that Israel’s creation was 
an international remedy for the plight of Jews, decided upon by a vote of the United 
Nations, and as such an act of “global affirmative action” for the Jewish people.  Israel 
continues to hold a special role as the only nation with an affirmative action policy for 
Jews.  This need not take away or clash with the rights of any non-Jewish citizen living 
there.  Israel today still has a considerable way to go in ensuring its non-Jewish 
population full equality.  Among some positive and immediate steps Israel would be 
served by taking include compensating for power imbalances by implementing 
affirmative action programs for non-Jewish citizens, embracing Arabic more fully as an 
official language, and continuing to commit to practices and policies that are democratic, 
secular, and pluralistic.121   
Once a fair and suitable two-state solution is implemented, the stage will be set to 
catalyze a revolution in the area of Arab-Jewish cooperative coexistence.  With more 
symmetrical power dynamics and less boiling crisis, the message of cooperative 
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coexistence will be easier to sell to the public.  One of the first major steps is to set-up a 
Peace and Reconciliation Commission in charge with implementing efforts aimed at 
healing and transforming relations between Arabs and Jews.  A host of cooperative 
efforts could be launched, including joint citizen-based dialogue groups, exchange 
programs, and entrepreneurial ventures.  In addition, the creation of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission could allow victims from both sides the chance to tell their 
stories publicly, having their truths acknowledged, and work to provide reparation and 
rehabilitation.  Perpetrators could seek potential amnesty if they agreed to full disclosure 
of their violations.  Such testimonies could help establish a fuller picture of the nature, 
causes, and extent of human rights violations committed.  Such a process could very well 
trigger public apologies from political leaders for the pains caused by their nation’s 
action.  This would be a powerful symbolic gesture.  
With continued efforts bringing together Arabs and Jews for peace building and 
cooperative coexistence, massive transformations at the sociopolitical level may very 
well follow.  This could lead to a climate where divisions along ethnic lines no longer 
remain a major dividing factor.  A renewed spirit of generosity and goodwill could 
eventually lead Israel and Palestine in the direction of joining a confederation with other 
West Asian countries for economic and political cooperation.  Energies devoted to war 
and militarism could be directed at stopping the continued deterioration and destruction 
of the planetary environment, clearly the biggest modern threat facing Arabs, Jews, and 
all of humankind.  Global cooperative efforts at environmental sanity could very well 
lead to a stateless and borderless world divided by eco-regions.  Israel and Palestine 
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could become two of the first 20% of nations to overcome the trappings of nationalism 
and militarism by abolishing borders and achieving full disarmament.122 
If these images of a connected, related, and interdependent world seem too lofty, 
than rewind to a time where Arabs and Jews lived as neighbours and friends in relative 
peace for centuries.  Whether in some small Jerusalem bakery sharing an oven, or in 
some creative futuristic vision of a new West Asia, cooperative coexistence has served 
us, and can continue to. 
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